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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
For four years, Kyle Richardson waited while the State continued his trial, then
sought an appeal, then unnecessarily delayed having him transported to Idaho for trial.
While Mr. Richardson waited, he was ineligible to undergo critically necessary drug
treatment thereby increasing the risk that his congestive heart condition would end his
life sooner, rather than later.  Due to the State’s delays, and despite Mr. Richardson’s
efforts to resolve the matter, he was not tried until four years after he was initially
arrested, and thus he was only able to have eighteen months of his twelve-year, with
five years fixed, Idaho sentence served concurrently with his five-year federal sentence.
Further, the trial witnesses’ memories were seriously impaired due to the length of time
that had passed since Mr. Richardson was first arrested for selling methamphetamine to
a State confidential informant (hereinafter, CI) on three occasions in 2011.  Because
Mr. Richardson unnecessarily waited for four years to have a jury trial, his Constitutional
and statutory rights to a speedy trial and his rights under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers were violated, his convictions and sentences should be vacated and his case
dismissed with prejudice.
Mr. Richardson also asserts that the district court erred when it admitted
evidence of uncharged prior bad acts at trial.  Mr. Richardson further contends that the
district court erred in awarding $2,738.46 in restitution where the State failed to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence the amount requested on behalf of the ISP.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In September of 2011, Kyle Richardson was contacted by a confidential
informant and sold the informant methamphetamine in three controlled buys.
(R., pp.18-19.)  On January 1, 2012, Mr. Richardson was charged with three counts of
delivery of methamphetamine.  (R., pp.33-34.)  After a preliminary hearing, the
magistrate court bound Mr. Richardson over into district court, and the State filed an
Information charging Mr. Richardson with three counts of delivery of a controlled
substance.  (R., pp.54-58, 60.)  At arraignment, Mr. Richardson entered a not guilty plea
to the charges.  (R., p.65.)  Though the original jury trial was set to occur on June 4,
2012, the State requested a continuance, and the trial was reset to August 20, 2012.
(R., pp.72-74.)
On July 31, 2012, the State filed a motion seeking to use the now-deceased
confidential informant’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial.  (R., pp.79-103.)  The
district court denied the motion.  (R., pp.166-172.)  On January 8, 2013, the State
received permission to file an interlocutory appeal.  (R., pp.182-183.)
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order denying
the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony, and the remittitur was issued on
July 8, 2014.  (R., pp.192-202, 204.)  When Mr. Richardson did not appear for a status
conference on July 24, 2014, the district court issued a bench warrant even though
defense counsel advised both the district court and the prosecutor that Mr. Richardson
was in federal custody until March of 2017.  (R., pp.205-206.)  No hearings were held
and no action was taken on the case until more than six months later when, from Terre
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Haute FCI in Indiana, Mr. Richardson filed a Demand for Speedy Trial and Final
Disposition in February of 2015.  (R., pp.207-210.)
After the Demand for Speedy, the district court held seven hearings to ascertain
the status of the prosecutor’s efforts to get Mr. Richardson back to Idaho for a trial.
(R., pp.211-240.)
Defense counsel stated Mr. Richardson’s current location, Terre Haute, Indiana,
and mentioned that he had been moved from a location in Oregon where he
unfortunately was ineligible for a drug treatment program because he had state charges
pending.  (2/19/15 Tr. p.27, Ls.13-22.)  Counsel said he wanted Mr. Richardson to get
his Idaho charges resolved so he could participate in a drug treatment program in
prison.  (2/19/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.21-24.)  The prosecutor asked the court to set another
status conference in another month.  (2/19/15 Tr., p.28, Ls.5-7.)
At the next month’s status conference, the prosecutor again told the court that it
was still planning to bring Mr. Richardson back from federal prison, and it was still in
that process.  (3/12/15 Tr., p.29, Ls.12-14.)  Again, the prosecutor asked for another
status conference in one month.  (3/12/15 Tr., p.29, Ls.14-16.)
At the next status conference, the prosecutor told the court that it had not made
any progress in its attempts to bring Mr. Richardson back from federal prison.  (4/23/15
Tr., p.32, Ls.11-13.)  Defense counsel reminded the court and prosecutor that
Mr. Richardson had filed a demand for speed trial and advised them that he would be
filing a motion to dismiss once the six months was up.  (4/23/15 Tr., p.32, Ls.15-20.)
The court set the case for another status conference in one month.  (4/23/15 Tr., p.33,
L.21 – p.34, L.4.)
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On June 25, 2015, the district court held another status hearing.  (6/25/15 Tr.1)
The prosecutor told the court and counsel that Mr. Richardson was still in the Indiana
Federal Prison, and the prison had received all of the documentation they needed
before he could be transferred to the Nez Perce County Sherriff and then transported to
Idaho.  (6/25/15 Tr., p.16, Ls.11-17.)  The prosecutor asked for another status
conference in a month, hoping Mr. Richardson would be back in Idaho at that time.
(6/25/15 Tr., p.16, Ls.18-20.)  On July 7, 2015, the Terre Haute warden signed a
Certificate of Inmate Status pursuant to the IAD.  (R., p.222.)
On July 30, 2015, another status conference was held in Mr. Richardson’s case.
(7/30/15 Tr.)  The prosecutor advised the court that there was a form missing that
needed to be provided to the federal prison in order to get Mr. Richardson into their
custody and asked for another status conference in four weeks.  (7/30/15 Tr., p.35,
Ls.13-19.)
Six months after his Demand for Speedy Trial was filed, Mr. Richardson filed a
motion to dismiss for violations of his right to speedy trial, asserting that the delay in
trying his case caused him to lose an opportunity to participate in an excellent drug
treatment program while in prison.2  (R., pp.230-239, 244-248, 266-268, 270-272, 275-
280.)
1 The sixteenth page of the transcripts prepared by Linda Carlton erroneously identifies
the hearing date as “August 25, 2015”; however, the hearing was held on June 25, 2015
which date is correctly identified on page 4 of the Carlton transcripts (Vol. II of II).
2 Mr. Richardson was heavily addicted to methamphetamine, yet has congestive heart
failure making the use of amphetamines/methamphetamines incredibly dangerous.
(PSI, p.12; 9/25/14 Tr., p.7, L.24 – p.8, L.11; see http://www.methproject.org/answers/
does-meth-affect-your-heart.html#Heart-in-Overdrive (website last visited 3/13/17).)
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On August 27, 2015, the district court set a trial date for December 7, 2015, and
scheduled a time to hear the motion to dismiss.  (R., pp.240-243.)  The State opposed
dismissal, asserting that when Mr. Richardson first demanded speedy trial, a detainer
had not yet been filed.  (R., pp.249-250.)  The State’s position was that Mr. Richardson
was required to re-demand his speedy trial rights after the detainer was filed in May or
June of 2015, and the 180-day time limitation set forth in the IAD did not begin until after
Mr. Richardson re-demanded his right on July 22, 2015.  (R., pp.249-250.)  Attachments
to the State’s response included a May 18, 2015 letter from the prosecutor’s office to
Terre Haute FCI enclosing copies of documents relating to the Idaho cases, including
the bench warrant, and asking that extradition proceedings begin.  (R., p.253.)
Mr. Richardson filed an additional brief in support of his motion, asserting that his
Constitutional right to a speedy trial was independent of, and superior to, the provisions
of the IAD.  (R., pp.266-268.)
The district court denied Mr. Richardson’s motion to dismiss after a hearing,
finding that “[a] detainer was lodged on June 24, 2015; therefore speedy trial was not
invoked until that date”, and the case then proceeded to trial.  (9/24/15 Tr.; R., pp.273-
274.)
At trial, several of the State’s law enforcement witnesses could not recall the
specifics of the drug transactions, due to the length of time that had passed between the
controlled buys and Mr. Richardson’s trial.  (Trial Tr., p.129, Ls.7-9; p.143, L.23 – p.144,
L.2; p.145, Ls.6-8; p.170, Ls.2-4; p.179, Ls.20-22; p.181, L.24 – p.182, L.7; p.184,
Ls.11-12; p.188, Ls.6-12; p.188, L.23 - p.189, L.7; p.193, Ls.4-5; p.195, Ls.11-18; p.196,
Ls.4-14; p.199, Ls.14-16; p.200, Ls.15-24; p.201, Ls.14-17, 23-25; p.204, Ls.12-14;
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p.208, Ls.11-14; p.217, Ls.1-3 (testimony of Officer Dammon); p.277, Ls.13-17; p.278,
L.22 – p.279, L.10; p.280, Ls.20-23; p.282, L.20 – p.283, L.7; p.285, Ls.5-24; p.288, L.9
- p.289, L.22 (testimony of Officer Yount).)
During the State’s case in chief, the prosecutor elicited from Officer Dammon
prohibited testimony about Mr. Richardson’s prior bad acts.  Specifically, the prosecutor
asked Officer Dammon how he became involved in the case, to which the Officer
responded, “I was provided information from a confidential informant about a Kyle
Richardson being involved in the distribution. . . of controlled substances.”  (Trial
Tr., p.119, Ls.3-20.)  Defense counsel objected on hearsay and I.R.E. 404(b) grounds.
(Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.19-24.)  The State argued that it was not hearsay as it was being
used to show the effect on the listener (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.1-6), and the district court
allowed the testimony, finding that it was foundational where it was “being provided only
to show the foundation for what the officer did” (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.7-12).
Ultimately, the jury convicted Mr. Richardson of the three counts of delivery of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine.  (Trial Tr., p.346, L.22 – p.347, L.6;
R., pp.324-325.)  On each count, the district court sentenced Mr. Richardson to twelve
years, with five years fixed, to be served concurrently with the other counts and with the
federal sentence.  (2/18/16 Tr., p.364, Ls.4-12; R., pp.355-358.)
Mr. Richardson objected to restitution, and the district court subsequently held a
hearing on the State’s request for reimbursement for buy money, ISP testing, and an
ISP employee’s testimony and travel.  (5/19/16 Tr. p.11, L.5 – p.26, L.24; Augmentation,
pp.1-12.)  In response to the objections, the State called Officer Dammon, who testified
that the department expended $2,100 for the controlled buys involving Mr. Richardson.
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(5/19/16 Tr., p.15, L.6 – p.17, L.24.)  Officer Dammon testified that he did not have any
knowledge of David Sincerbeaux’s expenses.  (5/19/16 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-12; p.21, Ls.13-
17.)  Yet the district court awarded the amount requested by the State, holding that the
defense failed to introduce evidence showing the request for restitution for
Mr. Sincerbeaux’s trial testimony was inappropriate.  (Augmentation, pp.9-11.)




1. Did the district court err when it violated Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial rights?
2. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Richardson’s motion to dismiss based on
the State’s failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers’ 180 day
deadline?
3. Did the district court err in admitting evidence of Mr. Richardson’s prior bad acts?
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. Richardson to pay




Mr. Richardson’s Statutory And Constitutional Rights To A Speedy Trial Were Violated
When The District Court Denied His Motion To Dismiss And Set The Case For Trial
Four Years After The Information Was Filed
A. Introduction
Mr. Richardson was arrested on January 4, 2012, and sat in jail when the trial
was first continued because the State’s key witness was unavailable on the first trial
setting of June 4, 2012.  Mr. Richardson sat in jail and then prison while the State took
18 months to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court an unfavorable district court ruling.
Mr. Richardson sat in prison while the district court held a status conference upon
remand, during which the prosecutor told the district court and defense counsel that it
was Mr. Richardson’s duty to get his Idaho case taken care of.  Mr. Richardson, tired of
sitting in prison and still without treatment for his severe substance abuse addiction,
filed a Demand for Speedy Trial, after which he continued to sit in prison.
Mr. Richardson sat in prison while the district court, in response to the Demand, held
hearing, after hearing, after hearing, to check on the State’s progress (or lack thereof) in
having Mr. Richardson brought to Idaho to be tried.  In October of 2015, Mr. Richardson
finally made it to Idaho, where he sat in jail for several more months until his trial.  Over
the four year period of time, the trial witnesses forgot what they had observed of the
controlled buys which made effective cross-examination of these witnesses difficult, if
not impossible.  Because Mr. Richardson’s statutory and constitutional speedy trial
rights were violated when he unnecessarily waited, to his detriment, for four years to
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have a jury trial, his convictions and sentences should be vacated and his case
dismissed with prejudice.
B. The District Court Violated Mr. Richardson’s Right To A Speedy Trial As
Guaranteed By The United States And Idaho Constitutions
By denying Mr. Richardson’s motion to dismiss, the district court violated his right
to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Idaho
Constitution. The United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.  In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the “speedy” trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is a “more vague
concept than other procedural rights,” and that what is considered “speedy” will vary
from case to case, depending on the unique facts of each. Id. at 521-30.  Thus, the
Barker Court adopted an ad hoc approach, taking into consideration four factors:  (1)
the length of the delay; (2) the reason(s) for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion(s)
of his right; and (4) the prejudice suffered by the defendant owing to the delay. Id. at
530-33.  With regard to the balancing of these four factors, the Court held as follows:
“We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient
condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.  Rather, they are
related factors that must be considered together with such other circumstances as may
be relevant.” Id. at 533.
The Idaho Constitution contains a virtually identical speedy trial guarantee.
IDAHO CONST. art I § 13.  Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the same
four-factor test for evaluating speedy trial claims under the Idaho Constitution as the
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United States Supreme Court has applied for evaluating speedy trial claims under the
United States Constitution.3 State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117 (2001).
Under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay, for speedy trial purposes, is
measured from the date formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever
occurs first. See State v. Risdon, 154 Idaho 244 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding a fifteen
month delay is long enough to be presumptively prejudicial and, therefore, triggered an
inquiry into whether it violated the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right).  The
defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight
in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of that constitutional right.
State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 353 (Ct. App. 2007).  Prejudice is to be assessed in light
of the interests the constitutional right to a speedy trial is designed to protect:  (1) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and (3) to limit the possibility the defense will be impaired. Id. at 354.
3 Although the right to a speedy trial under the Idaho Constitution is not necessarily
identical to the right to a speedy trial under the United States Constitution, State v.
Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 836 (Ct. App. 2005), the only difference identified thus far is the
starting point for measuring the period of delay.  According to the Young Court:
Under the Sixth Amendment, the period of delay is measured from the
date there is “a formal indictment or information or else the actual
restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.”
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S. Ct. 455, 463, 30 L. Ed.
2d 468, 479 (1971).  Under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is
measured from the date formal charges are filed or the defendant is
arrested, whichever occurs first.
Young, 136 Idaho at 117.  However, this distinction is not material to the present appeal
because Mr. Richardson was arrested on January 4, 2012, thus “starting the clock” on
the speedy trial issue for purposes of both the Idaho Constitution and the United States
Constitution.
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As set forth in detail below, under the Barker test, this Court should find that
Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial rights, under both the Idaho Constitution and United
States Constitution, were violated when the State took over four years to bring him to
trial.
1. The Four Year Delay Is Presumptively Prejudicial
The threshold factor to be considered pursuant to Barker is the length of delay.
With regard to this factor, the United States Supreme Court has held as follows:
The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism.  Until
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no
necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go in the balance.
Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the
length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent
upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31.
Mr. Richardson was arrested on January 4, 2012, but was not tried until
December 7, 2015, a delay of nearly four years (1,433 days).  This delay ought to be
sufficient to “trigger” further inquiry because, as the United States Supreme Court has
observed, “[d]epending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally
found postaccusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one
year.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (emphasis added).  This
observation appears to be consistent with Idaho precedent, as Idaho appellate courts
undertake full Barker inquiries not only with trial delays around a year, but sometimes
even with trial delays as short as seven months. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 133
Idaho 576, 582-83 (Ct. App. 1999) (implicitly finding a delay of nine months to be
sufficient to trigger a full inquiry under Barker); State v. Reutzel, 130 Idaho 88, 94
(Ct. App. 1997) (same); State v. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
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a delay of less than sixteen months is sufficient to trigger a full inquiry); State v.
Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 252 (1983) (holding that a delay of seven and one-half months
is sufficient to trigger a full inquiry); State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474 (1975) (holding that a
delay of fourteen months is sufficient to trigger a full inquiry).  Perhaps this is because
Idaho has a statute, the predecessor of which pre-dates statehood, that evidences the
Idaho Legislature’s belief that a delay of six months is simply too long to wait to try a
defendant in the average case. See I.C. § 19-3501 (providing that, unless “good cause”
is shown, if the defendant is not tried within six months from the filing of the information
or the defendant’s arraignment following indictment, the case against him must be
dismissed); State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257-58 (2000) (discussing the history of
I.C. § 19-3501).4
2. The State’s Reasons For The Delay, Taken As A Whole, Do Not Justify
The Delay
The second factor to be considered is the reason for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S.
at 531-532.  Mr. Richardson recognizes that any delay attributable to him will not count
towards the speedy trial calculation. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,
316-17 (1986); State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 332 (2011) (holding defendant’s request to
postpone the trial waives protections of speedy trial statute, even if trial is rescheduled
within six-month period).  However, he contends that the both the district court and the
State are responsible for the delay and not himself.
The Barker Court held that, with respect to the delays attributable to the
government:
4 Mr. Richardson analyzes I.C. § 19-3501 in some detail below, as that provision
underlies his claim that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial.
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[D]ifferent weights should be assigned to different reasons.  A deliberate
attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be
weighed heavily against the government.  A more neutral reason such as
negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for
such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the
defendant.  Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should
serve to justify appropriate delay.
Barker, 407 U.S. 531.
The initial delay of Mr. Richardson’s trial began when the State’s key witness was
unavailable for trial on the first trial setting, and the court continued the trial for two
months.  Then the State’s permissive appeal delayed Mr. Richardson’s trial by over two
years, and when a warrant was issued, it was apparently not served until approximately
seven months later.  The warrant prompted Mr. Richardson to file a demand for speedy
trial in an effort to move the process along, but neither the State nor the district court
successfully brought Mr. Richardson to trial until December of 2015, nearly a year after
he had initially made his speedy trial demand, and nearly four years since he was first
charged with the crimes.  The State has not provided any reasons for the delay, other
than to claim that no violation occurred because it did not place a detainer on
Mr. Richardson until May or June of 2015, and the district court ruled in favor of the
State.  For the reasons set forth below, none of the justifications offered by the State or
the court constitute “valid reasons” that might immunize the government from
responsibility for the nearly four year delay in bringing Mr. Richardson to trial.
a. The State’s Continuance Delayed The First Trial Setting
Two months before the trial set of June 4, 2012, the State filed a motion for a
continuance as one of its “key” witnesses was unavailable between June 4th and 8th,
2012.  (R., pp.72-73.)  After the State moved for a continuance, the district court
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vacated the hearing and reset the trial for August 20, 2012, a continuance of more than
two months.  (R., pp.74-75.)  The second trial setting was still within the speedy trial
limits.
b. The State Sought A Permissive Appeal Which Caused The Second
Set Trial Date To Be Necessarily Vacated And Delayed The Case
By Another Two Years
On July 31, 2012, twenty days before trial, the State filed a motion seeking to
admit the preliminary hearing transcript of a witness who had passed away following the
preliminary hearing.  (R., pp.79-103.)  Mr. Richardson promptly filed an objection to the
State’s motion in limine.  (R., pp.119-152.)
Two weeks after the State’s motion was filed, the district court vacated the trial
date to allow the State additional time to prepare a reply brief, and so the court could
schedule argument.  (8/16/12 Tr., p.13, L.25 – p.14, L.8.)  After hearing argument on the
State’s motion, the district court denied it.  (9/20/12 Tr.; R., pp.166-171.)  The State filed
a motion for permission to appeal the district court’s ruling on its Motion to Admit
Preliminary Hearing Transcript Testimony of Robert Bauer, and the Idaho Supreme
Court granted the State’s motion for permissive appeal.  (R., pp.174-175, 180, 182-
183.)  Eighteen months later, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s
order denying the State’s motion to use the preliminary hearing transcript, remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings, and a remittitur was issued.
(R., pp.192-202, 204.)
The United States Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315-
16 (1986), that “[u]nder Barker, delays in bringing the case to trial caused by the
Government's interlocutory appeal may be weighed in determining whether a defendant
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has suffered a violation of his rights to a speedy trial.”  The eighteen month delay
caused by the State’s interlocutory appeal violated Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial rights.
c. Mr. Richardson Asserted His Right To A Speedy Trial On
February 2, 2015; Thus The District Court Erred In Concluding That
Mr. Richardson’s Speedy Trial Rights Were Not Invoked Until
June 24, 2015
The third factor in the Barker analysis is “[w]hether and how the defendant
assert[ed] his right” to a speedy trial. Id.  Because the more serious the prejudice
attendant to a delayed trial is, “the more likely a defendant is to complain,” the
“defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right . . . is entitled to strong evidentiary weight
in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right” to a speedy trial. Id.
at 531-32.
The district court erred in finding Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial rights were not
invoked until June 24, 2015.  On February 2, 2015, Mr. Richardson caused to be filed a
Demand for Speedy Trial.  (R., pp.207-210.)  The Demand was served both on the
prosecutor and the district court.  (R., pp.207-208.)
Further, the parties including the court indicated on the record that they were well
aware of Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial rights and that he was asserting them.  The
district court scheduled a hearing for February 19, 2015, to check on the status of the
speedy trial demand.  (2/19/15 Tr., p.26, Ls.9-19.)  At the February 19, 2015 status
conference hearing, the district court mentioned receiving Mr. Richardson’s demand for
speed trial and final disposition.  (2/19/15 Tr., p.26, Ls.17-19.)  The prosecutor said,
“Your Honor, we are working on that with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, on filing the
appropriate paperwork and arranging for a transport.”  (2/19/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.10-12.)
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Two months later, defense counsel reminded the court and prosecutor that
Mr. Richardson had filed a demand for speedy trial and advised them that he would be
filing a motion to dismiss once the six months was up.  (4/23/15 Tr., p.32, Ls.15-20.)
Overall, the district court held seven hearings in Mr. Richardson’s absence from
February 19, 2015, to August 27, 2015, to ascertain the status of the case and to
consider Mr. Richardson’s demand for speedy trial.  (R., pp.212-218, 229, 240.)
Although the district court ultimately denied Mr. Richardson’s motion to dismiss
finding his speedy trial right was not invoked until a formal detainer was put in place on
June 24, 2015 (R., p.273), such a finding is clearly contradicted by the record.  As the
Barker Court recognized, Mr. Richardson’s assertions of his right should weigh heavily
against the State.
d. Mr. Richardson Suffered Prejudice As A Result Of The Delay
The final Barker factor is the prejudice suffered by the defendant owing to the
delay.  The Supreme Court has held that prejudice in this regard includes:  (a) the
detrimental impact on career and family that is attendant to oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (b) anxiety and concern of someone waiting for trial; and, of course, (c)
the impairment of the defense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.  Obviously, the last form of
prejudice is of the greatest concern because it “skews the fairness of the entire system.”
Id.
In the present case, all three types of prejudice appear to be present.
Mr. Richardson was never released from federal custody, but had pending state
charges so was ineligible for the drug treatment programming he so desperately
needed.  (See PSI, pp.9-14, (explaining Mr. Richardson’s congestive heart failure and
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his heavy use of and addiction to methamphetamine).)  Although Mr. Richardson was
initially sent to a superb drug treatment facility in Oregon, due to his pending state
cases in Idaho he was transferred to Indiana and thereby lost the opportunity to
participate in the much-needed drug treatment program.  (2/19/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.13-24;
R., p.268; PSI, p.10.)  Further, Mr. Richardson had to contend with the anxiety of
waiting nearly four years for his trial, not knowing whether he might walk out of jail a free
man, be condemned to a life in prison, or something in between.
In addition, Mr. Richardson suffered actual prejudice because Officers Dammon
and Yount’s memories faded by the time Mr. Richardson was actually tried in December
of 2015.  At trial, Officer Dammon attributed his inability to recall many of the events
surrounding the crimes Mr. Richardson was alleged to have committed due to the four
year delay between the investigation and trial.  (Trial Tr., p.188, L.23 - p.189, L.7.)  For
example, during the defense’s cross-examination of Officer Dammon, he could not
recall whether the CI was eager to assist the police or reluctant to do so.  (Trial
Tr., p.179, Ls.16-22.)  While testifying, Officer Dammon indicated that he did not
remember whether the CI reached inside the storage unit before he met with
Mr. Richardson.  (Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.18-20.)  Officer Dammon could not remember if he
lost sight of the CI’s vehicle on the way to the location where he was scheduled to meet
Mr. Richardson.  (Trial Tr., p.188, L.23 – p.189, L.8.)  It was clear that the significant
amount of time that had passed impacted Officer Dammon’s memory and made
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effective cross-examination of him very difficult (Trial Tr., p.189, Ls.1-75); the long delay
in trying Mr. Richardson harmed his defense.
Officer Yount’s memory was similarly affected.  Officer Yount told the prosecutor
that he did not recall all of the specific details of the controlled purchases because “[i]t
happened four years ago.”  (Trial Tr., p.277, Ls.10-16.)  It was clear from his testimony
that his inability to recall was due to the four years that had elapsed since the
investigation.  (Trial Tr., p.277, Ls.13-17; p.288, L.9 - p.289, L.22.)  Later, during the
cross-examination of Officer Yount, the officer could not recall where he was stationed
for surveillance, how far away he was, whether he saw any exchange of drugs or
money, whether he saw Mr. Richardson get out of the vehicle, or who was with him
during the investigation.  (Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.5-24; p.287, Ls.14-20; p.289, Ls.6-10.)  As
a result, defense counsel had difficulty in the cross-examination of this witness—the
delay of over four years harmed Mr. Richardson’s ability to effectively cross-examine
Officer Yount.
Mr. Richardson’s defense was significantly compromised because the witnesses
could not recall the circumstances by which Mr. Richardson was alleged to have sold
methamphetamine—including locations and whether the CI was out of the sight of the
officers at critical times.  Mr. Richardson’s defense was further compromised because
the improper introduction of propensity evidence as to why Officer Dammon began
5 Officer Dammon appeared to be frustrated.  When he again answered “Not that I
recall, no,” defense counsel tried to clarify whether he affirmatively recalled not losing
sight of the CI or whether he did not remember whether he did or did not lose sight of
the CI.  (Trial Tr., p.188, L.23 – p.189, L.4.)  Officer Dammon responded, “Beings this
was four years ago -- . . . -- I’m testifying off what I put in my report.”  (Trial Tr., p.189,
Ls.5-7.)
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investigating Mr. Richardson—the State was able to prove its case by demonstrating at
trial that because he committed this crime in the past, he must have committed the
crime in the instant case.
3. Balancing
When all of the above factors are taken together—the extremely long delay, all of
which was attributable to the government, Mr. Richardson’s assertion of his right, and
the prejudice suffered—this Court should find that Mr. Richardson’s right to a speedy
trial, as guaranteed by both the Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution,
has been violated.
C. The District Court Violated Mr. Richardson’s Right To A Speedy Trial As
Guaranteed By Idaho Statute
Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial rights as guaranteed by Idaho Code §§ 19-106 and
19-3501 were violated when it took the State nearly four years to bring him to trial.
(R., p.276.)  Idaho Code § 19-106 also guarantees to every criminal defendant in Idaho
the right “[t]o a speedy and public trial,” although it does not define “speedy.”
Nevertheless, Idaho Code elsewhere provides as follows:
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the
prosecution or indictment to be dismissed in the following cases:
. . .
(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his
application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months from the date the
information is filed with the court.
I.C. § 19-3501.  This statutory provision “supplements” the above-referenced
Constitutional guarantees of a “speedy” trial, and has been interpreted to give
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“additional protection beyond what is required by the United States and Idaho
Constitutions.” State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257-58 (2000).
Under § 19-3501, the government is required to demonstrate “good cause”6 in
order to have the defendant’s trial continued beyond six months.  The showing of “good
cause” is evaluated in terms of the “reason for the delay,” as that language was used in
Barker. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260.  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “good cause
means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the
delay.” Id.
For the reasons set forth in detail in subpart B(2), above, there was neither a
“valid reason” nor “good cause” for the district court to have permitted the State to
continuously requests status hearings while the State was dilatory in learning how to
effect a detainer and investigating how to initiate Mr. Richardson’s transport to Idaho.
Accordingly, the district court erred in denying Mr. Richardson’s statutory right to a
speedy trial.
II.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Richardson’s Motion To Dismiss Based On The
State’s Failure To Comply With The 180-Day Deadline Under The Interstate Agreement
On Detainers
A. Introduction
A warrant was issued for Mr. Richardson’s arrest on July 24, 2014.  (R., p.281.)
When Mr. Richardson learned of the bench warrant, he filed a Demand for Speedy Trial
and Final Disposition on February 2, 2015.  (R., pp.207-210.)  Despite his request, the
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district court found that a detainer was not placed on Mr. Richardson until June 24,
2015, and he was not transported to Nez Perce County to resolve the charges until
October 23, 2015.  (R., pp.40, 90, 281, 286.)  Although Mr. Richardson filed a motion to
dismiss due to the violation of his speedy trial rights (see Section I), the district court
concluded that the IAD was applicable, and Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial clock was not
started until the detainer was lodged on June 24, 2015.  (R., pp.273-274.)
Mr. Richardson asserts that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion to
dismiss because the prosecutor was dilatory in having a detainer placed, and misled the
court and counsel as to how Mr. Richardson could be brought back to Idaho for trial.
Where Mr. Richardson became aware of a bench warrant in this case on January 6,
2014, and filed a demand for speedy trial on February 2, 2015, the district court should
have found Mr. Richardson substantially complied with the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (hereinafter, IAD) and dismissed the case.
B. Standard Of Review
Whether the requirements of the IAD have been met is a mixed questions of law
and fact. United States v. Reed, 910 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1990).  The court reviews such
cases de novo. Id.
C. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Richardson’s Motion To Dismiss Based
On The State’s Failure To Comply With The 180-Day Deadline Under The IAD
The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Richardson’s right to a speedy trial,
as guaranteed by the IAD, was not invoked until a detainer was lodged on June 24,
6 See State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 495 (Ct. App. 1987) (“The burden is on the state to
show good cause for the delay.”).
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2015.  The district court concluded that Mr. Richardson’s speedy trial rights under the
IAD were not violated.  Mr. Richardson asserts that the district court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss.
The Federal Government, the District of Columbia, and forty-eight (48) states,
including Idaho, have entered into the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Alabama v.
Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001).  The purpose of the IAD is set forth in the text of
the Idaho code section adopting the IAD:
The agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered into
by this state [Idaho] with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the
form substantially as follows:
(a) The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner,
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints,
and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated
in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of
prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the
party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination
of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried
indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find that
proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when
emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the
absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this
agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.
I.C. § 19-5001(a). In accordance with this purpose, the IAD creates uniform procedures
for expeditiously resolving pending charges and detainers against prisoners in the party
states. See I.C. § 19-5001 et seq.  Specifically, the IAD provides that once a person,
has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional
institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the
term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried
indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has
been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one
hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to
the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his
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request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or
complaint[.]
I.C. § 19-5001(c)(1).  Because the IAD is a congressionally sanctioned compact, it falls
within the purview of the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution; it is a
federal law subject to federal construction. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000);
United States Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl.3. Both Indiana and Idaho are parties to the
IAD agreement.  I.C. § 19-5001(a); Indiana Code § 35-33-10 et seq.
Further, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Agreement as
follows:
Article IX of the Detainer Agreement states that the Agreement “shall be
liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose.” The legislative history
of the Agreement, including the comments of the Council of State
Governments and the congressional Reports and debates preceding the
adoption of the Agreement on behalf of the District of Columbia and the
Federal Government, emphasizes that a primary purpose of the
Agreement is to protect prisoners against whom detainers are
outstanding.
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 448–49 (1981).
The requirements necessary for a prisoner to invoke the protections of the IAD
include:  (1) a written detainer; (2) written notice to the appropriate court of the
prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction of the place of the prisoner’s incarceration; (3) a request
for a final disposition of the pending indictment, information or complaint; (4) a certificate
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner stating the term of the
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to
the prisoner.  I.C. § 19-5001(c)(1).  One of the primary purposes of passage of the IAD
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was to minimize the adverse effects detainers had upon prisoners:  “[b]ecause a
detainer remains lodged against a prisoner without any action being taken on it, he is
denied certain privileges within the prison, and rehabilitation efforts may be frustrated.”
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 360 (1978).  In so seeking to achieve the IAD’s
intended purpose, the Idaho Legislature has instructed that “[t]his agreement shall be
liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose.”  I.C. § 19-5001(i).
In Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 (1993), the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the 180-day time period under the IAD is triggered by the date the
inmate’s request for disposition is received by the prosecutor in the receiving state, or
the date the request for disposition is received by the warden in the sending state.  The
Court concluded “that the receiving State’s receipt of the request starts the clock.” Id. at
51.  The Court thus held the 180-day time period under the IAD “does not commence
until the prisoner’s request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually
been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the
detainer against him.” Id. at 52.  The decision in Fex emphasizes the importance of the
court and prosecutor in a receiving State that issues a detainer against a prisoner
receiving actual notice of the request for disposition under the IAD.
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the IAD is instructive. See State v. Johnson,
196 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 1999).  The Johnson Court was concerned with whether a letter,
sent to the district court by the prisoner’s public defender notifying the court of the
prisoner’s invocation of his IAD right, substantially complied with the “written notice” of
IAD. Id. 196 F.3d at 1004.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the letter satisfied the
requirements under IAD as it was “undisputed that the public defender's letter to the
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court contained the information required by the IAD to be conveyed to the district court,
for the letter expressly stated that Johnson was serving a sentence in the state of
Washington and that he requested a speedy trial. Id.  Likewise,  in United States v.
Berg,7 the prisoner, Berg, had mailed a letter, entitled “Demand for Speedy Trial,” which
referenced the IAD, to both the prosecuting U.S. Assistant Attorney and court. Id. at 1.
A few months later, Berg mailed a second “Demand for Speedy Trial” to the prosecutor
and the court. Id.  In both filings, Berg “listed his address as the New Mexico
Department of Corrections in Clayton, New Mexico and demanded that there be timely
disposition of the pending federal charge pursuant to the IAD.” Id.  The Court
concluded that Berg’s filing substantially complied with IAD:
[I]t seems clear that the defendant's demands for a speedy trial
substantially complied with the information required under the IAD. Both of
the filings sent to the court and the U.S. Attorney’s office were captioned
with his name and the correct case number and were titled “DEMAND
FOR SPEEDY TRIAL.” . . .  They expressly stated that the defendant was
requesting a speedy trial under the IAD. In the second letter dated
January 11, 2011, he also indicated that he was “sentenced and in
custody.”
Id. at 4.
While there have been only a few Idaho appellate court cases interpreting the
IAD, one recent case was State v. Mangum, 153 Idaho 705 (Ct. App. 2012).  In
Mangum, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the 180-day time period does not begin
to run until the receiving state has received the requisite documentation from the
sending state. Id. at 713.  The Mangum Court acknowledged a circuit split on strict
versus substantial compliance with the IAD, and opted for a strict interpretation of the
IAD. Id. at 711.  However, the Mangum Court first discussed the lack of evidence that
7 U.S. v. Berg, 2011 WL 3471216 (D. Guam 2011).
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the delays in filing the detainer and in forwarding the certifications was the result of
purposeful interference with Mr. Mangum’s IAD rights. Id. at 713.  The Court held, “we
conclude the IAD requires strict compliance with its request provisions, at least where
no intentional interference by State parties is shown,” apparently marking an exception
to strict compliance when justice may so require. Id.
1. The State’s Misfeasance Excuses Mr. Richardson From Strictly Complying
With The IAD Where The State Delayed In Having The Detainer Placed
And The State And The District Court Affirmatively Misled Mr. Richardson
As To His Obligations To Have Himself Transported To Idaho For Trial
The purpose of the IAD “is to address concerns that untried charges pending in
other jurisdictions and difficulties in securing a speedy trial ‘produce uncertainties which
obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.’” Mangum, 153 Idaho at 709
(citing I.C. § 19-5001(a).)  Although the states adopting the IAD must do so by statute,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the IAD’s interpretation presents a
question of federal law. Mangum, 153 Idaho at 709.
Because the statute is to be “liberally construed” to rapidly dispose of outstanding
detainers, when the prisoner has attempted to obtain a speedy trial, but the government
has failed to fulfill its obligations under the Act, courts have dismissed indictments not
prosecuted within 180 days. See United States v. Reed, 910 F.2d 621, 625-26 (9th Cir.
1990); see also United States v. Smith, 696 F.Supp. 1381 (D. Or. 1988) (holding that
the U.S. Marshal’s failure to forward one of the required supporting documents to the
appropriate court was not fatal to the prisoner’s claim because “a prisoner’s rights under
the IADA should not be subject to intentional or negligent sabotage by government
officials”).
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In Reed, the defendant was notified of the charge against him, but was misled by
a deputy and was not provided with the correct speedy trial request form. Reed, 910
F.2d at 624.  Despite finding that he did not adequately invoke his speedy trial rights,
the Ninth Circuit held that Reed’s indictment had to be dismissed for violation of the
speedy trial provision of the IAD. Id. at 626.  The Court held, “in cases where the
government has failed to meet its obligations, and the prisoner has attempted, but
through no fault of her own failed to comply with the technical requirements of the Act,
the IADA’s remedial provisions still apply.” Reed, 910 F.2d at 624.
a. The State Unreasonably Delayed In Having A Detainer Placed On
Mr. Richardson
For five months, the prosecutor represented to the district court and defense
counsel that she was doing everything possible to bring Mr. Richardson back to Idaho
for trial.  (2/19/15 Tr.; 3/12/15 Tr.; 4/23/15 Tr.; 6/25/15 Tr.)  In reality, the prosecutor
apparently did not successfully place a detainer on Mr. Richardson—essentially the first
step in having him brought back to Idaho—until late June of 2015.  (R., p.255.)
Although the prosecutor told the court and counsel at every monthly status conference
that she was working on it, or had nearly completed the process, she did not take the
first step to bring Mr. Richardson back to Idaho until June 24, 2015, almost five months
after he filed the demand for speedy trial.
Here, like in Johnson and Berg, there is no question the proper court and the
proper prosecuting agency that had lodged the detainer against Mr. Richardson,
received actual notice of Mr. Richardson’s request for final disposition as of February 2,
2015.  (R., pp.207-210.)  Moreover, both the court’s and the prosecutor’s actual notice
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and knowledge of the request for disposition is clear from a review of the transcript of
the hearing held in Mr. Richardson’s absence before the district court on February 19,
2015.  (See 2/19/15 Tr., p.26, L.17 – p.27, L.12.)  Indeed, no one appears to dispute
that both the court and the prosecutor’s office had actual knowledge and notice of
Mr. Richardson’s repeated requests for speedy resolution of the pending charges.  The
Idaho Legislature has mandated that the IAD “shall be liberally construed so as to
effectuate its purpose.”  I.C. § 19-5001(i).  It would subvert the purpose of the IAD if the
agency charged with issuing the detainer misinformed both the court and defense
counsel of the process necessary to initiate the IAD and mislead them to place the
burden on the defendant.  The prosecutor claimed, after she received actual notice of
Mr. Richardson’s desire to resolve the pending charges, that the IAD was not effective
until after she confirmed with the holding institution that she formally place a detainer.
This is precisely what the prosecutor asked and precisely what the district court
ordered.
The district court treated June 24, 2015, the date the Nez Perce County
Prosecutor’s office confirmed with the Indiana Warden that she wished to have a
detainer placed on Mr. Richardson, as the triggering date for the 180-day deadline.
(R., p.273.)  However, the district court erred finding that a IAD was not triggered until a
formal detainer from Idaho was ultimately lodged in Indiana against Mr. Richardson.
Mr. Richardson had provided actual notice to both the court and prosecutor of his intent
to invoke the provisions of I.C. § 19-5001, and it was only due to the State’s
misfeasance in failing to timely place a detainer that the State was then able
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successfully argue that Mr. Richardson did not meet the IAD’s requirements until the
date the prosecutor officially asked a detainer to be placed.
b. The Prosecutor And The District Court Affirmatively Misled
Mr. Richardson As to The Process By Which He Could Resolve His
Idaho Charges
On July 24, 2014, approximately a week after the remittitur was issued in the
permissive appeal, the district court held a status hearing on Mr. Richardson’s case.
(7/24/14 Tr., p.22, L.20 – p.23, L.3.)  At the hearing, held in Mr. Richardson’s absence,
the prosecutor advised the parties that Mr. Richardson was incarcerated in federal
prison and was not expected to be released until March of 2017, and the prosecutor
requested a bench warrant.  (7/24/14 Tr., p.22, L.24 – p.23, L.3.)  Defense counsel
asked that his client be brought back to Idaho to resolve his pending cases before his
federal prison sentence was finished in three years.  (7/24/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.5-9.)  The
prosecutor then said, “Your Honor, the State does have information.  That needs to be
initiated by the defendant.”  (7/24/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.16-18.)  She told the court and
defense counsel that the defendant was to initiate the process to have him transported
back to Idaho in the federal courts, and the district court confirmed the correctness of
her statement.  (7/24/14 Tr., p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.6.)  However, both the prosecutor and
the district court had wrongly informed the defense.
2. A Warrant Is Equivalent To A Detainer In This Circumstance
The United States Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that documents other
than those explicitly labeled “detainers” may trigger the protection of the IAD.  In United
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 349 (1978), the Supreme Court considered whether the
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IAD is triggered when the United States uses the writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum (hereinafter, Writ) to obtain custody of state prisoners.  The Court noted
the Writ, including its historical role and function, “bear little resemblance to the typical
detainer which activates the provisions of the [IAD] Agreement.” Id. at 357.
In distinguishing the Writ from an IAD detainer, the Court recognized the
following characteristics of a detainer:  (1) it can be lodged against a prisoner at the
behest of the prosecutor or law enforcement officer without judicial review; (2) it does
not require the immediate presence of a prisoner but instead serves to put institution
officials on notice that a prisoner is wanted by another jurisdiction “upon his release
from prison”; and (3) further action is required by the receiving State to obtain the
prisoner. Id. at 358.  Although the IAD does not define a detainer, House and Senate
reports relating to the IAD explain the detainer is “a notification filed with the institution
in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending
criminal charges in another jurisdiction.” Id. at 359 (citations omitted).  In contrast, Writs
are immediately executed, they are issued by a federal court, and they have a long
history dating back to the first judiciary act. Id. at 360-61.  Given these differences, the
problems the IAD sought to eliminate do not arise with the Writ.  Thus, the Court held
that a Writ is not a detainer for purposes of the IAD.  Id. at 361.
For the same reasons the Mauro Court found the Writ was not a detainer for IAD
purposes, a warrant is a detainer for IAD purposes; it can be lodged against a prisoner
at the behest of the prosecutor or a law enforcement officer; it does not require the
immediate presence of a prisoner but instead puts institution officials on notice that a
prisoner is wanted by another jurisdiction “upon his release from prison”; and finally,
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additional action is required before the receiving State can obtain the prisoner. Id. at
358.  The warrant and the detainer are thus indistinguishable in their effect for IAD
purposes.
This point was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Carchman v.
Nash, 473 U.S. 716,727 (1985).  In Carchman, the Court determined the plain language
of the IAD, as well as its legislative history, reflected that the IAD was intended only to
apply to detainers premised on untried indictments, informations or complaints, thereby
excluding detainers based on probation violations. Id. at 726-27.  In reaching this
conclusion, the Court cited to the IAD drafters’ definition of a detainer under the IAD: “A
detainer may be defined as a warrant filed against a person already in custody with the
purposes of insuring that he will be available to the authority which has placed the
detainer.” Id. at 727 (quoting Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, p.74).
While agreeing with this definition and the fact that a detainer could arise from parole or
probation violations, the Court determined that by its own terms, the IAD did not apply to
all detainers, only those arising from untried indictments, informations or complaints. Id.
The arrest warrant in Mr. Richardson’s case was signed by the district court after
Mr. Richardson failed to appear for a status conference on June 24, 2014.  (R., p.205.)
The warrant was served on Mr. Richardson in January of 2015.  (R., p.231.)  The State
initiated extradition proceedings by May 18, 2015, by sending a letter regarding
“Extradition Proceedings” which included information on the Idaho charges as well as
an “IAD Prosecutor’s Certification.”  (R., pp.253-255.)  Further, Mr. Richardson waived
extradition in a Notice of Untried Indictment dated June 1, 2015.  (R., p.264.) See
Pyzer v. State, 109 Idaho 376 (Ct. App. 1985) (a warrant and request for extradition
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may constitute a detainer under I.C. § 19-5001); cf. State v. Smith, 119 Idaho 11, 12
(Ct. App. 1990) (where defendant failed to establish a warrant for extradition was issued
and served on Wyoming authorities demanding his appearance in Idaho, defendant’s
wavier of extradition did not trigger the IAD).
As a result, the district court erred in considering the date the prosecutor
confirmed to the authorities at Terre Haute FCI that she did want them to treat the
warrant as a detainer, to be the date of the detainer; instead, the date of the detainer is
the date Mr. Richardson had a warrant outstanding against him in Idaho (Nez Perce
County), and the prosecutor requested extradition.  See Pryzer.  For these reasons,
much like a prematurely filed notice of appeal (see Idaho Appellate Rule 17; Weller v.
State, 146 Idaho 652, 653-54 (Ct. App. 2008)), the warrant should be treated as a ripe,
or perfected detainer, as of the date Mr. Mangum was served with it: January 6, 2015.
(R., p.231.)  Alternatively, the prosecutor’s letter dated May 18, 2015, which sought to
extradite Mr. Richardson should be treated as the date the detainer was perfected. See
Pryzer.
3. Mr. Richardson Substantially Complied With The IAD’s Requirements
As set forth above, Idaho Code § 19-5001 (c)(1) provides:
The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the
appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of the
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1).  The purpose of the certificate of status is to “allow[] the
prosecutor to make a rational decision whether to prosecute and the State may, for
example, decline to prosecute upon learning the prisoner is already serving a lengthy
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sentence elsewhere on a more serious charge.” State v. Moe, 581 N.W.2d 468, 471-
472 (N.D. 1998).  Both the Ninth Circuit and the Idaho Legislature mandate that the IAD
statute must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. See State v. Johnson, 196
F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 1999); Idaho Code § 19-5001(i).  Thus, the question before this
Court is whether Mr. Richardson substantially complied with I.C. § 19-5001.
Mr. Richardson asserts that he substantially complied with I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1)
as he provided all of the information needed for the prosecutor to make a decision to
prosecute his case, i.e.,  his federal case number, his term of commitment, the time he
has already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, his good time
credit, and his approximate parole eligibility date.  (See R., pp.207-210.) See United
States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding defendant did not substantially
comply with the IAD requirements where “Dent’s letter did not include his term of
confinement, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on his sentence,
or any information concerning good-time credits or parole eligibility); State v. Roberts,
427 So.2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1983) (holding defendant was entitled to IAD relief
even though he did not provide authorities with a formal certificate of inmate statute
because he submitted a memorandum that stated his “jail credit time, a conditional early
release date, a maximum incarceration date and a parole eligibility date.”); State v.
Smith, 858 F.2d 416 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding defendant did not have to provide
the actual certificate inmate statute to substantially comply with IAD, but “he did have an
obligation to furnish the information that would be contained therein.”); U.S. v. Berg,
2011 WL 3471216 (D. Guam 2011) (finding that the defendant had substantially
complied with the certificate of inmate status requirement by demanding a speedy
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resolution of his pending federal charge and providing the address of the New Mexico
Department of Corrections where he was currently serving his sentence.)
Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Richardson sent his demand to the appropriate
court and the Nez Perce County prosecutor’s office asking for a speedy trial and
invoking the IAD.  (R., pp.207-210.)  These documents were mailed by Mr. Richardson,
while he was in prison, to the prosecutor’s office and filed by the court.  (R., pp.207-
210.)  Thus, on February 2, 2015, both the court and the prosecutor’s office had all of
the information necessary under the IAD to address Mr. Richardson’s request to have
his Nez Perce County charges resolved.  While this information was submitted by
Mr. Richardson and not the Terre Haute FCI Warden’s office, proper information was
conveyed to the correct parties.  The State did not claim it lacked notice that
Mr. Richardson wanted to resolve the Nez Perce County charges, that it had no idea
where Mr. Richardson was being held in prison in Indiana, the length of his Indiana
prison sentence, his parole eligibility, or good time/credit for time served; rather, the
State only claimed that it lacked receipt of proper forms, which it received July 21, 2015.
(R., pp.219-228.)
Because of Mr. Richardson’s substantial compliance with the IAD, as well as
both the prosecutor’s and the court’s actual knowledge of Mr. Richardson’s desire to
resolve the outstanding warrant/detainer, the triggering date for the 180-day time limit
should commence on the date Mr. Richardson’s request for disposition was received by
to the Nez Perce County Prosecutor’s office and the Nez Perce County Court Clerk’s
office, as evidenced by the certified mail receipts: February 2, 2014.  As of this date,
Mr. Richardson had provided the prosecutor’s office and the court clerk’s office with all
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relevant and necessary information under the IAD to permit the State to secure his
return to Idaho.
The State’s failure to bring Mr. Richardson to trial within 180 days after receipt of
Mr. Richardson’s request for disposition, requires dismissal of the charges in the instant
matter with prejudice.  Mr. Richardson asks this Court to vacate the district court’s order
denying his motion to dismiss and remand his case to the district court for the entry of
an order dismissing the instant matter with prejudice.
III.
The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of Mr. Richardson’s Prior Bad Acts
A. Introduction
At trial, through the testimony of Detective Dammon, the jury was told that
Detective Dammon became involved in the case because he heard that Mr. Richardson
was involved in the distribution of controlled substances.  Mr. Richardson asserts that
district court erroneously admitted the hearsay statement without analyzing the
prejudicial nature of the statement and failed to address the I.R.E. 404(b) violation.
The district court found that testimony of prior alleged drug sales by
Mr. Richardson was “provided only to show the foundation for what the officer did” and
“not for the truth of the matter of what’s been said by the out-of-court statement.”  (Trial
Tr., p.120, Ls.8-12.)  However, this testimony was not foundational, but was evidence
demonstrating only Mr. Richardson’s propensity to commit crimes.  Further, the district
court erred in failing to consider the prejudicial effect of such information versus any
probative value pursuant to I.R.E. 403.
37
Finally, the district court erred when it admitted the State’s evidence in absence
of any showing of good cause that would excuse the State’s failure to timely provide
and serve notice of its intent to introduce prior bad acts evidence at trial.
B. Standard Of Review
Upon review of the district court’s determination to admit prior bad acts evidence
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), this Court reviews both whether the evidence admitted was
relevant to a material and disputed issue regarding the crime charged, other than
propensity, and whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165
P.3d 273, 283 (2007).  This Court generally reviews the district court’s decision whether
to admit prior bad acts evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).  Similarly, the district
court’s determination as to whether to admit or to exclude evidence based upon the
potential for prejudice of that evidence under I.R.E. 403 is likewise reviewed by this
Court for an abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227 P.3d 918,
921 (2010).  Three pertinent considerations are attendant upon review for an abuse of
discretion:  (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as an issue of
discretion; (2) whether the district court acted in accordance with applicable legal
standards and within the proper bounds of its discretion; and (3) whether the district
court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Id.
However, the relevance of evidence is a question of law and therefore this Court
reviews the district court’s determination that evidence is relevant de novo. State v.
Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764 (1993).
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C. The District Court Erred When It Admitted Testimony Of A Prior Bad Act Against
Mr. Richardson Because The State Failed To Provide Timely Notice Of Its Intent
To Introduce This Evidence; Because This Evidence Was Not Relevant To Any
Material Issues At Trial, Other Than Propensity; And Because The Evidence Was
More Prejudicial Than Probative
Mr. Richardson asserts that the district court failed to act in accordance with
applicable legal standards when it allowed Detective Dammon to testify to allegations
that Mr. Richardson sold controlled substances in the past, as this evidence was
irrelevant to the issues at trial and should have been excluded pursuant to I.R.E. 403
and 404(b).
 “As with the admissibility of any piece of evidence, where the probative value of
the statement[s] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . this
evidence should be excluded.” State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 477 (1976).  This
requires an analysis of whether the audio recording should have been excluded under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, which allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”  See
I.R.E. 403.  Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if,
inter alia, the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, danger of misleading the jury, or if the
evidence would involve needless presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. Tapia,
127 Idaho 249, 254 (1995).  “The trial judge, in determining probative worth, focuses
upon the degree of relevance and materiality of the evidence and the need for it on the
issue on which it is to be introduced.” Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 110
(1987).  To some extent, all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117
Idaho 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989).  The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether
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it harms the defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict
regardless of other facts presented. Id.  This inquiry does not center on “whether the
evidence is harmful to the strategy of the party opposing its introduction,” but on
whether the evidence “invites inordinate appeal to lines of reasoning outside the
evidence or emotion which are irrelevant to the decision making process.” State v.
Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 604 (1991).
1. The District Court Erred In Admitting Res Gestae Evidence
The State argued that the testimony was “not being used to show the truth of the
matter asserted; it’s just being used to show the effect it had on this listener,” and the
district court admitted the testimony “only to show the foundation for what the officer
did.”  (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.1-12.)  However, Mr. Richardson submits that the district
court’s basis in admitting the evidence could be interpreted as res gestae.  The district
court’s discussion did not expressly inform the parties it was straying from the State’s
proposed basis for admission and admitting the evidence under a different Rule 404(b)
exception.  (See Trial Tr. p.120, Ls.7-12.)  Absent an express ruling by the district court,
it is reasonable to interpret the district court’s ruling as admitting the evidence as res
gestae.
The principle of res gestae does not provide a separate, independent basis to
admit evidence apart from the Idaho Rules of Evidence. “In 1985, the Idaho Rules of
Evidence were adopted which established that all relevant evidence is admissible,
unless otherwise provided by the Idaho Rules of Evidence or other rules for the courts
of Idaho.” State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240 (2009) (footnote omitted) (citing I.R.E.
402).  “[T]he Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of all evidence in the
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courts of this State.” Id. Since the Rules control, the concept of res gestae does not
provide a mechanism to admit evidence outside the confines of the Rules. Res gestae
evidence is still subject to the Rules’ admissibility requirements.
Res gestae is a “concept[ ] of relevance. . . . In essence, [it is] shorthand to
explain why certain evidence is relevant.” State v. Sams, 160 Idaho 917, 919 (Ct. App.
2016); see also State v. Alvord, 47 Idaho 162, 272 P. 1010, 1012 (1928) (“This
evidence must be justified, if at all, by its relevancy.”).  “Res gestae is defined in part as:
‘The whole of the transaction under investigation and every part of it.’” State v.
Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1305
(6th ed. 1990)).  “Res gestae refers to other acts that occur during the commission of or
in close temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be described to
‘complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly
contemporaneous happenings.’” Id. at  18  (quoting  1  KENNETH S. BROUN  ET  AL.,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 799 (John W. Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992)).  Hence,
evidence that is not strictly probative of the crime charged, but which is “‘inseparably
connected to the chain of events of which the act charged in the information is a part,’”
may be admissible as res gestae. State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 670 (1975) (quoting
Monge v. People, 406 P.2d 674, 678 (Colo. 1965)); see also State v. Miller, 157 Idaho
838, 842 (Ct. App. 2014) (courts can sometimes admit “evidence of events that are not,
strictly speaking, part of the charged criminal episode in order to give the jury a
‘complete story’ if exclusion of the evidence could result in jury confusion or misleading
inferences”).  In sum, res gestae is simply another way to describe relevant evidence; it
does not create a new exception for the admissibility of evidence.
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Since res gestae evidence refers to other acts than the charged offense, its
admissibility is often curbed by the limitations in Rule 404(b).  Rule 404(b) “prohibits
introduction of evidence of acts other than the crime for which a defendant is charged if
its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the
defendant’s propensity to engage in such behavior.” Sams, 160 Idaho at 919.  The
Rule “is principally designed to protect against admission of purely propensity
evidence.” Id. at 919–20.  Of course, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be
admissible for “other purposes” as listed in Rule 404(b), ch as knowledge or plan.  I.R.E.
404(b); Sams, 160 Idaho at 919; see also Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 18 (noting that the
enumerated “other purposes” for admission of Rule 404(b) evidence is not
“exhaustive”).  In this respect, res gestae is essentially “an exception to the general
prohibition against the use of other misconduct evidence.” Blackstead, 126 Idaho at
17–18.  This exception, however, applies “only where the charged act and the
uncharged act are so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a rational and
complete presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the uncharged
misconduct.” Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
 Under the res gestae exception or any other exception to Rule 404(b), the
evidence must be “relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant’s
character or criminal propensity.” State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 913 (2015) (quoting
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013)); see also I.R.E. 402 (irrelevant evidence is
inadmissible).
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court held that res gestae could not be used to
admit propensity evidence. State v. Kravolec.  No. 44250, 2017 Opinion No. 3 (Jan. 23,
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2017).  In Kralovec, the Court “decline[d] to perpetrate the use of the res gestae
doctrine in Idaho,” and held “that evidence previously considered admissible as res
gestae is only admissible if it meets the criteria established by the Idaho Rules of
Evidence.” Id. at 6-7.  Although the Court discussed res gestae in the context of
hearsay, its decision to disavow the principle of res gestae generally supports
Mr. Richardson’s argument that the evidence was not admissible because it was not
relevant and was not necessary to give the jury the complete story, that is, “to show the
foundation for what the officer did.”  (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.7-10.)
In Mr. Richardson’s case, during the State’s direct examination of its witness, the
prosecutor elicited from Officer Dammon prohibited testimony of Mr. Richardson’s prior
bad acts.  The prosecutor inquired regarding how the detective became involved in the
investigation of Mr. Richardson:
Q. How did you become involved with that case?
A. I was provided information from a confidential informant.
DEFENSE: Objection.  That would be hearsay.  I want to get it
before he blurts it out.
THE COURT: Well, it’s not currently hearsay, so I’m going to
overrule the objection.
PROSECUTOR:
Q. So how -- how did you become involved on that day?
A. I was provided information from a confidential informant about a
Kyle Richardson being involved in the distribution --
DEFENSE: Objection.
THE WITNESS: -- of controlled substances.
DEFENSE: It’s hearsay.
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PROSECUTOR: May I respond?
DEFENSE: More than that, it’s a violation of 404(b).
THE COURT: Mr. Coleman?
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, this isn’t hearsay.  It’s being used to
show -- it’s not being used to show the truth of the
matter asserted; it’s just being used to show the effect
it had on this listener in terms of what he did with his
investigation, the next step.
THE COURT: Well, I’m going to allow it.  It’s foundational.  The jury
is instructed that this is information being provided
only to show the foundation for what the officer did.
It’s not for the truth of the matter of what’s been said
by the out-of-court statement.
(Trial Tr., p.119, L.3 – p.120, L.12.)  Whether or not the State knew it was soliciting an
answer containing information as to a prior bad act, Detective Dammon’s actions are
imputed to the State. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 147 (2014); State v. Ellington,
151 Idaho 53, 61 (2011).  In overruling Mr. Richardson’s objection, the district court
never addressed the lack of prior notice by the State.  (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.7-12.)
The prosecutor argued that the testimony was not hearsay as it was only being
used to show the effect on the listener—what prompted the next step of the
investigation; however, it was not necessary for the State to establish why Detective
Dammon began investigating Mr. Richardson.  This information had no probative value
in addition to being inflammatory.  Further, it was irrelevant.  In State v. Parker, 157
Idaho 132, 145 (2014), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that evidence offered to
show “the effect on the listener” is generally not relevant, and “is often used as a ruse to
put inadmissible evidence before the jury improperly.”  Idaho cases indicate that, where
evidence tends to establish why someone other than the defendant took an action that
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is merely incidental to the charged offense, this evidence is not relevant because it is
not of consequence to determining whether the defendant’s guilt is more or less likely.
See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 567 (2007).  In this case, whether Detective
Dammon began investigating the case because he heard that Mr. Richardson had
previously been involved in the distribution of controlled substances does not make it
more or less likely that Mr. Richardson sold a CI methamphetamine at a later date.  And
the only manner in which any such inference could arise would be if the inference of
criminal propensity were embraced, i.e., if the fact-finder were to assume that
Mr. Richardson had sold drugs in the past and therefore was more likely to have done
so on the charged occasion.
“Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to show a defendant’s criminal propensity.” Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667, 227 P.3d at
921.  Such evidence may, however, be admissible for a non-propensity or character
purpose so long as the prosecution provides timely notice of its intent to use such
evidence. Id.  In this case, the evidence proffered by the State of prior alleged drug
distribution by Mr. Richardson lacked both timely notice of its intended use by the State
and relevance to any purpose other than propensity, and the error was not harmless.
2. The State Failed To Provide Timely Notice Of Its Intent To Use I.R.E.
404(b) Propensity Evidence
Under I.R.E. 404(b), the State may be able to introduce other-acts evidence
against a defendant if, inter alia, the State files and serves notice of its intent to
introduce such evidence reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the district court
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excuses the lack of such notice upon a showing of good cause for the failure to provide
such notice.  I.R.E. 404(b).
The Idaho Supreme Court has addressed the practical consequences for the
State’s failure to provide timely notice of its intent to introduce prior bad acts evidence at
trial. See State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225 (2008).  In Sheldon, the State elicited
evidence at trial regarding allegations that the defendant had made statements
admitting that he had previously engaged in drug sales. Id.  at  227.   In  reviewing
whether the admission of the prior bad acts evidence was error in light of the State’s
failure to file timely notice of this evidence, the Sheldon Court held that compliance with
the notice requirement of I.R.E. 404(b) is mandatory. Id. at 230-231.  The Sheldon
Court further concluded that, because the State failed to comply with the notice
provisions contained in I.R.E. 404(b), the State’s prior bad acts evidence was
inadmissible. Id.  As the introduction of this evidence was highly prejudicial to the
defendant, and because such evidence also likely caught defense counsel off-guard
when the district court permitted its introduction, the Sheldon Court vacated the
defendant’s conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine. Id.
This Court should do the same.  The State in this case failed to provide notice of
its intent to admit evidence of uncharged acts “reasonably in advance of trial.”  In fact,
the State did not provide any notice of its intent to admit this evidence.  Despite this, the
prosecution elicited information from Detective Dammon that he became involved in the
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case because he heard that Mr. Richardson had been involved in the distribution of
controlled substances in the past.8  (Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.14-20.)
As such, the district court did not find good cause that would excuse the
untimeliness.  The lack of notice, coupled with the lack of any discernible specifics as to
where and when the alleged transaction(s) took place, deprived Mr. Richardson of any
ability to defend against these allegations.  In light of this, the district court erred when it
admitted evidence that he had been involved in controlled substance distributions in the
past.
3. The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of Prior Drug Transactions
By Mr. Richardson Because This Evidence Was Not Relevant To Any
Material Issue At Trial Other Than Propensity And Because The Potential
Prejudice Of This Evidence Substantially Outweighed Any Probative Value
That The Evidence May Have Had
In addition to being barred by the failure to give timely notice, Mr. Richardson
further asserts that the district court’s admission at trial of allegations of prior drug
transactions involving Mr. Richardson was error because this evidence was not relevant
for any admissible purpose, and because the prejudice of this evidence substantially
outweighed any probative value.
As a general rule, relevant evidence is admissible at trial and evidence that is not
relevant is not admissible at trial. See I.R.E. 402.  Relevant evidence is defined as
evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
8 In later questioning, the prosecutor again appeared to be trying to elicit improper I.R.E.
404(b) evidence where, after the witness identified Mr. Richardson, the State asked
him, “Do you know how many times, rough estimate, you spoke with Kyle Richardson
prior to any of this investigation?”  (Trial Tr., p.121, L.24 – p.122, L.1.)
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would be without the evidence.”  I.R.E. 401; State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 682
(Ct. App. 2010).  “As with the admissibility of any piece of evidence, where the probative
value of the statement[s] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . .
. this evidence should be excluded.” State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 477 (1976).
In State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134 (Ct. App. 2011), the police were working with
an informant who believed that she could get the defendant to sell her drugs based
upon the fact that he had allegedly sold her drugs on prior occasions. Id.  at  136.  At
trial, the court initially granted the defendant’s motion in limine seeking to exclude
mention of prior alleged drug sales pursuant to Rule 404(b). Id. at 139-40.  However,
the State elicited testimony at trial of the very type that was found to be inadmissible –
testimony from the informant that the defendant had sold her drugs in the past. Id. at
140.  The justification proffered by the State was that this evidence was admissible to
inform the jury why the CI contacted the defendant to ask him to buy
methamphetamine. Id. at 141.  The Idaho Court of Appeals held that prior alleged drug
transactions between an informant and the defendant are not admissible to demonstrate
why the informant targeted the defendant as part of his or her work with law
enforcement. Id. at 142.  Because the facts in Naranjo are highly similar to the facts of
this case, a similar result is dictated.
Given that the evidence of prior alleged drug sales between the CI and
Mr. Richardson was not relevant to the charged offense for any purpose other than to
demonstrate propensity, the district court also should have excluded this evidence on
the basis that the potential for prejudice of the allegations that Mr. Richardson had sold
drugs in the past substantially outweighed any probative value of this evidence. See
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I.R.E. 403.  Establishing why it is that the CI may have formed the belief that
Mr. Richardson might agree to sell him methamphetamine is wholly irrelevant to the
issue at trial of whether that sale eventually did occur and was not necessary for the
complete story of the actual transaction charged.  As in Naranjo, the State’s evidence of
general allegations that Mr. Richardson had sold drugs on undisclosed occasions to the
CI served no purpose other than to place Mr. Richardson’s propensity to commit drug
offenses in front of the jury.  Thus, admission of this evidence tended to work great
prejudice on Mr. Richardson’s case, as this evidence necessarily would tend to imply
that Mr. Richardson had a propensity to commit offenses like the ones charged in this
case.  This prejudice was amplified by the lack of notice that the State would be eliciting
testimony of this nature against Mr. Richardson, thus effectively defeating his ability to
investigate and prepare a defense against the assertions that he had engaged in drug
sales with the CI in the past.
In sum, the evidence alleging prior uncharged drug transactions by
Mr. Richardson was not relevant to his underlying guilt of the charged offense, nor was
it necessary in order to provide the jury with a complete story of the charge.  This
evidence depicted Mr. Richardson as a person with a propensity to commit the charged
offense in the minds of the jury.  The total lack of disclosure by the State, coupled with
the extremely general nature of the allegation, precluded Mr. Richardson from being
able to provide a defense against the assertion that he had distributed controlled




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Richardson To Pay
Restitution In The Absence Of Substantial Evidence To Support Such An Award
A. Introduction
Mr. Richardson asserts that, by ordering restitution for buy money and for the
work performed by Idaho State Police personnel in the absence of substantial evidence
to support such an award, the district court abused its discretion because, in doing so, it
failed to act consistently with applicable legal standards and failed to reach its decision
by an exercise of reason.
B. Standard Of Review
A trial court’s decision to order restitution is discretionary, and “[a]n abuse of
discretion may be shown if the order of restitution was the result of arbitrary action
rather than logical application of the proper [statutory] factors . . . .” State v. Richmond,
137 Idaho 35, 37 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted).  In reviewing for an abuse of
discretion, an appellate court “must determine whether the trial court:  (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id.
(citation omitted).
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Richardson To Pay
Restitution In The Absence Of Substantial Evidence To Support Such An Award
Mr. Richardson asserts that the district court abused its discretion in failing to act
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards
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applicable to specific choices it had, and failing to reach its decision by an exercise of
reason, because the restitution award was not supported by substantial, competent
evidence.  The district court awarded restitution to the ISP despite the fact that ISP lab
employee David Sincerbeaux never verified his lodging/travel expenses or his salary
and hours worked.  In fact, Mr. Sincerbeaux did not testify at all at the restitution hearing
and the State did not offer a sworn statement containing the information.  Further, the
witness called at the restitution hearing lacked direct knowledge of the CI’s payment of
$300.00 to Mr. Richardson.  The prosecutor’s request in this case, and thus the district
court’s order which granted that request in full, is unsupported by the evidence.
The State sought restitution under the Controlled Substances Act, codified as
I.C. § 37-2732(k).  (5/19/16 Tr., p.18, Ls.18-23; Augmentation, p.4.)  Idaho Code § 37-
2732(k) provides, in relevant part:
Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this chapter . .
. the court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement
agencies in investigating the violation. Law enforcement agencies shall
include, but not be limited to, the Idaho state police, county and city law
enforcement agencies, the office of the attorney general and county and
city prosecuting attorney offices. Costs shall include, but not be limited to,
those incurred for the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law
enforcement officers and witnesses throughout the course of the
investigation, hearings and trials, and any other investigative or
prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of
employees.
I.C. § 37-2732(k).
In light of the lack of “specific guidance regarding the nature of a restitution
award or the procedure to obtain such an award” under I.C. § 37-2732(k), the Idaho
Supreme Court considers the general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304. State v.
Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 258 (2012).  Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304, courts may order
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restitution in a separate written order, that is, the court can enter essentially a civil
judgment for restitution against the defendant. State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806
(2004).  However, “restitution under section 37-2732(k) must be based on a
preponderance of the evidence, and an award of restitution will not be disturbed if
supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Cunningham, No. 44176, 2017 WL
750590, *3 (Feb. 27, 2017) (not yet final); State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170
(Ct. App. 2014).
In Cunningham, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed what constitutes
“substantial evidence.” Cunningham, 2017 WL 750590 (Feb. 27, 2017).  The
Cunningham Court addressed the discretionary nature of restitution under § 37-2732(k)
and the fact that a court may only order restitution “to the State for prosecution
expenses ‘actually incurred.’” Cunningham, at *2 (quoting I.C. § 37-2732(k)) (emphasis
in original).   In Cunningham, the only evidence supporting the restitution award was a
Statement of Costs that did not contain itemized time entries explaining the tasks
performed or the expenditures made in that case, and the signature on the form was not
notarized or otherwise certified as correct. Cunningham, at *2.  The Court held that the
restitution award was not supported by evidence, because the Statement of Costs, an
unsworn representation, was not “substantial evidence” upon which restitution pursuant
to § 37-2732(k) could be based. Id. at *3.  The Court vacated the restitution award and
remanded the case for further proceedings, holding “[a]t a minimum, measuring up to
section 37-2732(k)’s burden to prove expenses actually incurred will generally require
sworn statements that delineate the time spent performing specific tasks.” Id. at *4.
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In Mr. Richardson’s case, the State requested restitution for the buy money the
confidential informant gave Mr. Richardson, the cost of testing the drugs, and the costs
of ISP employee David Sincerbeaux travel and time testifying.  (Augmentation, pp.4-8.)
The State submitted a restitution request from the Lewiston Police Department detailing
four payments on four different dates for a total dollar amount of $2,100.00.
(Augmentation, p.4.)  The State also submitted an unserved trial subpoena for David C.
Sincerbeaux (Augmentation, p.5) and a restitution letter requesting 5.5 hours at a rate of
$37.32 per hour and travel expenses of $133.20, for a total of $338.46 (Augmentation,
p.6).  The document did not identify a specific ISP employee, but was signed by Anne
Nord, a Laboratory Manager, and was not notarized. Id.
Mr. Richardson objected to restitution, and the court held a restitution hearing.
(5/19/16 Tr.)  At the restitution hearing, the State asked the district court to order the
ISP be reimbursed $638.46 for travel expenses and lab fees.  (5/19/16 Tr., p.12, L.25 –
p.13, L.5.)  The State submitted personnel and travel costs in the amount of $338.46.
(Augmentation, pp.5-6.)  However, the ISP employee, David Sincerbeaux, who had
purportedly done the work for which the prosecutor was seeking reimbursement, did not
prepare an affidavit or appear at the restitution hearing.  (5/19/16 Tr.)
After the prosecutor called Officer Dammon and questioned him about the
restitution request for $2,100 for buy money, defense counsel inquired:
Q.  Okay.  And then in terms of charges for Mr. Sincerbeaux from the state
lab, you don’t really have any knowledge of any of that stuff, do you, other
than the fact that he showed up in court here?
A.  That’s correct.
. . .
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Q.  But you don’t have any knowledge of Mr. Sincerbeaux’s -- how those
charges came about?  You just know they’re in your file?
A.  I’m not the one that requested restitution for Mr. Sincerbeaux.  I have
no knowledge of that.
 (5/19/16 Tr., p.20, L.4 - p.21, L.17.)  Ultimately, Officer Dammon did not have any
knowledge of Mr. Sincerbeaux’s wages or expenses.  In fact, the district court had to
refer back to the trial testimony of Mr. Sincerbeaux in order to reach a conclusion that
restitution was appropriate.  (Augmentation, pp.10-11.)  Although David Sincerbeax
testified at the trial, he was not asked about this document or the amount of time he had
spent on the case.  (See Trial Tr., p.251, L.4 – p.273, L.9.)  In ordering restitution, the
district court noted that the defendant had challenged the restitution claim with respect
to Sincerbeaux’s testimony, but concluded “there was no evidence that the request was
inappropriate.”  (Augmentation, p.11.)  The district court awarded restitution in the
amount of $2,738.46, which included the $638.46 requested for the ISP.
(Augmentation, pp.9-16.)
Mr. Richardson submits that this is error because there is absolutely no evidence
in the record as to how the prosecutor calculated this hourly rate or these expenses.
The only evidence submitted during the restitution hearing was State’s Exhibit C, which
simply states that personnel spent 5.5 hours at a rate of $37.32 per hour and that total
travel expenses (per diem, lodging, transportation) were $133.20—there is nothing in
that exhibit which explains that hourly rate or what the costs were for.  (Augmentation,
p.6.)  Thus, there is no evidence in the record that the restitution request reflects the
State’s actual costs.    Mr. Richardson asserts that the expenses and the hourly rate are
not supported by substantial, competent evidence.
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Further, by holding “there was no evidence that the request was inappropriate”
(Augmentation, p.3), the district court effectively changed the State’s burden to prove
restitution by a preponderance of the evidence to an affirmative burden on the defense
to disprove the State’s request.  However, the burden is on the State to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount requested was supported by
substantial and competent evidence.  Thus, the district court erred by finding otherwise
and awarding restitution.
Additionally, although State’s Exhibit C, the ISP Controlled Substance
Restitution, was admitted at the restitution hearing, the witness who testified only had
direct knowledge of the payment of $1,800 worth of “buy money” and was not present
for the $300 purportedly spent on September 23, 2011.  (5/19/16 Tr., p.13, L.13 – p.14,
L.11; p.16, L.16 – p.17, L.24; p.19, Ls.13-25.)  Thus, no witness testified who had first-
hand knowledge of the CI paying Mr. Richardson $300.  (5/19/16 Tr.)
Since the State did not present substantial and competent evidence that the ISP
expenses were the result of the criminal conduct, the restitution order is not based on
sufficient evidence.  As such, the restitution award should be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Richardson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
order denying his motion to dismiss and remand his case to the district court for the
entry of an order dismissing the instant matter with prejudice.  Alternatively,
Mr. Richardson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and remand
to the district court for a new trial.  Mr. Richardson requests that the restitution award
be vacated.
DATED this 16th day of March, 2016.
__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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